Concepts for the Study of Information Embodiment by Bates, Marcia J.
Concepts for the Study of Information Embodiment
Marcia J. Bates
LIBRARY TRENDS, Vol. 66, No. 3, 2018 (“Information and the Body: Part 1,” edited by 
Andrew M. Cox, Brian Griffin, and Jenna Hartel), pp. 239–66. © 2018 The Board of Trustees, 
University of Illinois
Abstract
The growing study in information science of the role of the body 
in human information practice may benefit from the concepts de-
veloped around a set of fundamental forms of information previ-
ously published by the author. In applying these concepts to the 
study of human information practice, we see a framework that nicely 
names and locates the major components of an understanding of 
information seeking of all types, including that related to the body. 
We see information in nature, what happens to information when 
it encounters a nervous system, and how that information is used 
within nervous systems to both encode and embody the experiences 
of life. We see information not only in direct encounters with the 
body but also as it is experienced through extensions of the body, 
used for both input and output purposes. We also see information in 
the body in relation to a larger framework of forms of information 
encompassing both internal and external (exosomatic) information. 
Finally, a selective review is provided of related research and theory 
from biology, anthropology, psychology, and philosophy, which sup-
ports and deepens our understanding of the approach taken here 
to information embodiment. 
Introduction
I am grateful to the editors of these issues on information and the body 
for making me aware of the topic, and welcoming my contribution to it. In 
this article, I initially set out to demonstrate the ready applicability of the 
several information concepts I had developed in an earlier article (Bates 
[2006] 2016) to the content of these issues. I had written about information 
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with the objective of finding a foundational conceptualization of informa-
tion that could be used as a basis for theory and thinking in the field (see 
also Bates 2005). For these Library Trends issues, I wrote an initial draft 
focusing on demonstrating how the concepts I had introduced earlier re-
lated to the consideration of information and the body.
My own ideas had been seated in extensive research done at the time 
of writing the two above-mentioned articles on information. The current 
editors quite reasonably asked me to enrich the current discussion with 
an updated review of the available research and thinking in the scien-
tific fields supporting this view. What I discovered was an explosion of 
fascinating new work being done in biology, anthropology, psychology, 
philosophy, and information science that provided abundant support for 
this approach and added many new insights.
The work in these related fields is very much in flux, however. The work 
is at that early stage in the development of a new area or approach in sci-
ence, where a profusion of ideas is being produced. It is not fully clear at 
this point where all the numerous positions of researchers harmonize or 
conflict, nor how the new understanding can be simplified and rendered 
internally consistent. There is as yet no simple, pat, description of the 
new theory that can be dispensed within a few paragraphs. Instead, many 
researchers are developing approaches that provide new meaning for old 
questions like “What is consciousness?”; “How is information transferred 
and stored within and between nervous systems?”; and, of course, the core 
question of these issues: “What is the role of information in the body, and 
how does it relate to our traditional understanding of information seeking 
and information transfer?”
A full survey of all the new developments in these related fields would 
be book-length or more. Here, instead, I will identify some key papers and 
themes that demonstrate the exciting work going on in the several fields, 
and which support the approach taken in this article—and which probably 
support many of the other articles in these issues as well. 
For all these reasons, I have decided to leave the original straightfor-
ward exposition of the information concepts as is in part 1 of the paper, 
to simplify the narrative and promote understanding. Then, in part 2 of 
the paper, I discuss various of the philosophies and research themes relat-
ing to the points made in part 1, in order to deepen understanding, and 
demonstrate the breadth of support from these other fields for research 
in our field on information and the body.
Metatheoretical Commitments
The approach taken in this paper largely draws on the conventional un-
derstanding that scientific research is fundamentally empirical, inductive, 
materialist, and rooted in various widely known and long-established tech-
niques (“scientific method”) for observing natural phenomena, experi-
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menting with them, conceptualizing relationships and causality within the 
observed phenomena, and testing and disproving or confirming hypoth-
eses and conclusions developed about them.
Whole libraries have been written about philosophical questions sur-
rounding the underlying metatheory of science. This article does not ad-
dress these numerous questions, and instead rests on the general scientific 
methodological approach that is assumed in most scientific writing.
Part 1 of the article, in which concepts from the author’s earlier work 
are applied in the area of information embodiment, only claims value for 
the information disciplines. Fine-grained theoretical and empirical details 
from other disciplines are not reviewed. The goal is to build on these other 
sciences’ findings, without engaging deeply in those fields’ own scientific 
disputes and controversies. I want to use their work—in its current un-
settled state—to enrich our thinking in information science, not to try to 
solve those other fields’ own debates, for which they alone have the neces-
sary understanding.
The selective review in part 2 of the article pulls out illustrative findings 
from numerous writings across several disciplines that address embodi-
ment, and reflects on the application of these findings to information 
science.
Part 1. Concepts
Natural and Represented Information
In writing this article, I set out to interpret the information concepts that 
I developed in an earlier article, “Fundamental Forms of Information” 
(Bates [2006] 2016), for the purposes of these issues’ topic, information 
and the body. In the process, I developed insights that go beyond the ear-
lier article, and may advance these issues’ topic as well.
These terms are defined for the purposes of the information disciplines; 
no claims are made beyond these fields. The distinctions made between 
terms are meaningful for information work. Biologists and neurologists 
would find some of these terms hopelessly general for their purposes. The 
objective here has been to define for our own needs, and to do so in a way 
that does not conflict with what is known at those other levels. Information 
science information terms need to rest upon the lower levels of life cor-
rectly, but not be concerned with technical details that are out of the scope 
of research interests for the information disciplines.
I have defined information as the pattern of organization of matter and 
energy. The patterns made by the shape and movement of sound waves, 
by the composition of the air, by the structure of a building—these are all 
information. The baseline for information is natural information: all infor-
mation is natural information in that it exists in the material world of mat-
ter and energy. (All definitions are drawn from Bates [2006] 2016, 1036.)
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Represented information is an important subclass of natural information: 
it is natural information that is encoded or embodied. In turn, encoded 
information is natural information that has symbolic, linguistic, and/or 
signal-based patterns of organization, while embodied information is the cor-
poreal expression or manifestation of information previously in encoded 
form.
Natural information is converted into represented information when it encoun-
ters a nervous system or an extension of a nervous system. (I have deliberately 
used the nonspecific term encounter in order to avoid concerning ourselves 
with the particulars at the cellular level of how nervous systems sense and 
respond to their environments.) Let us illustrate these concepts with an 
example. Picture the spider in its web. An insect flies into the web and is 
snared by the sticky silk of the web. The insect struggles to escape the web, 
so it is important for the spider to get to the insect and wrap it in more silk 
quickly to immobilize it.
Now, where is the information in this situation? The patterns of organi-
zation of the constituent elements in the spider, the web, the insect—these 
patterns are all natural information; they exist in the material world of 
matter and energy. When the insect flies into the web and is caught by it, it 
disturbs the web; it pulls the web in a certain direction. That tug of the web 
becomes a sensory signal to the spider, that is, input to the central nervous 
system of the spider, where it is then linked to the spider’s ability to move 
and direct its actions. Once inside the body of the spider, that signal has 
become represented information and is transmitted as encoded informa-
tion. The spider, sitting at the center of the web, feels the tug of the silk, 
and knows that an insect (or something else) has been snared, and knows 
what part of the web has captured the insect. The spider now moves in 
the direction of the tug, and locates the prey. Other instincts about wrap-
ping the prey and repairing the damage to the web kick in, and the spider 
proceeds with its life. 
Over hundreds of millions of years, animals have developed the ability 
to convert interactions with natural information into represented infor-
mation within their own nervous systems, and, further, to use that repre-
sented information to act in and interact with the rest of life.
This is not to claim that the trace that the spider creates in its nervous 
system is an identical or eidetic representation of what it is encountering. 
All species have evolved in ways to select and shape inputs for their own 
purposes. For example, human beings are very social animals, and depend 
for their survival on the ability to get along with their conspecifics. We 
have evolved to readily distinguish one person from hundreds by their 
faces, and we can detect numerous complex emotions by reading the rap-
idly changing musculature on people’s faces as they feel emotion. On the 
other hand, we are much less good at distinguishing and remembering 
differences in the appearance of other people’s knees, unless, perhaps, we 
are orthopedic surgeons specializing in knees.
 concepts for study/bates 243
Above, it is said that natural information is converted to represented in-
formation when it encounters a nervous system or an extension of a nervous 
system. Note that in this case the insect is not directly captured and eaten 
by the spider, as happens with many predator/prey situations. Instead, the 
spider creates an extension of its nervous system by spinning out its web, 
which it uses to capture prey.
The insect encounters the extension of the spider’s nervous system, 
i.e., its web, which, in turn, through the flexibility and ease of movement 
of the silk, transmits information—a pattern of organization of matter 
and energy—down the silk to the center and to the spider. Note also that, 
through evolution, the spider spins webs that are so thin and difficult to 
see for other insects’ sensory apparatus, that these other insects fail to see 
the web, and fly into it to their peril. (The web is, shall we say, “under their 
radar.”)
Encoding and Embodiment
We can extend these concepts in countless ways when it comes to thinking 
about human experience and use of information in relation to the body. A 
fundamental point to understand is that within a nervous system, informa-
tion moves in and out of encoding and embodiment constantly.
Human beings are animated by a gigantic and complex nervous sys-
tem. The encoding that happens in the brain and nerves of the body is 
converted into embodiment and back into other forms of encoding on a 
continual basis. Information is encoded in the brain by means of neurons, 
their thresholds for firing, and their interconnections. When I stand on 
a cliff overlooking the San Francisco Bay and the Golden Gate Bridge, I 
“see” the bay, whatever that means. I do not see or feel the neurons fir-
ing that create that experience of the bay; I only experience myself as 
standing on the land experiencing the sight and feel of the bay, along 
with the scent of the saltwater and the brushing of my skin by the breeze. 
Somehow, in ways that have been only partially explained to date, human 
beings experience a site as a view of the site itself, with oneself at the cen-
ter of our view. We feel our weight on the ground, and have a very good 
three-dimensional experience of what surrounds us and where we are in 
relation to everything else. Somehow, our brain is able to take the natural 
information that is impinging on our body and creating signals in nerves 
to the brain, and convert that input into a lived picture, an experienced 
embodiment, of the world around us. It is really quite remarkable! (Com-
pare Metzinger 2009; Westerhoff 2016.) 
Thus, those electrical and chemical signals in our bodies—which bear 
no resemblance whatever to the world they are depicting—nonetheless 
work together somehow to enable us to feel that we are in fact in the world, 
and that we can see, hear, smell, touch, and taste it all directly. This is what 
I have called experienced information: the pattern of organization of subjec-
tive experience, the feeling of being in life, of an animal.
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But to have that lived experience, there is first a great deal of sensing, 
encoding, and converting from one kind of signal to another that must 
take place through a complex interplay of many parts of our bodies. Again, 
we are struck by the remarkable reality that, through the use of processing 
of sensory inputs into nerve signals, often including the linking of current 
inputs with previously stored memories and experiences, we are enabled 
to have the feeling of being in life. We feel that we are experiencing life 
directly, when in fact that experience is mediated by a multi-billion-cell 
nervous system that processes the original sensory input through many 
layers and conversions. 
As noted earlier, represented information is information that is encoded 
or embodied. Within nervous systems, information is moving in and out 
of encoding and embodiment all the time. Information is encoded in that 
those neurons and their associated nervous system apparatuses somehow 
enable us to distinguish the difference between, say, “retrieve” and “re-
prieve,” even though those signals in no way look or sound like retrieving 
or reprieving, whatever that would look like. In fact, we can experience 
those words embodied as sounds in our auditory system as we hear, as text 
when we read them, or even as actions we conduct as we endeavor to re-
trieve something or reprieve someone. But we cannot experience the un-
derlying nerve signals and processes that make the embodied experience 
possible. The information that enables us to distinguish the two words is 
encoded in some kind of neural code that we cannot yet read.
We may not know how our bodies do it, but the fact remains that we ex-
perience embodied information all the time. So, within a brain full of en-
coded information, we somehow create a lived experience of embodiment 
of our environment and our bodies. A pain in a toe is felt as a pain right 
there in the toe, even though the processing of the associated nerve signals 
may go on in our brains and in nerves leading to and from the toe. Fur-
ther, even though the toe might have been bumped hard, we could not be 
currently feeling any of the pain in that toe unless all that other associated 
information processing also took place elsewhere in our nervous system.
In that earlier paper (Bates [2006] 2016), I also described enacted infor-
mation and expressed information. The former is the pattern of organization 
of actions of an animal in, and interacting with, its environment, utilizing 
capabilities and experience from its neural stores, while the latter is the 
pattern of organization of communicatory scents, calls, gestures, and, ul-
timately, human spoken language used to communicate among members 
of a species and between species.
An animal acting in life, say, eating or fighting, is embodying capabili-
ties stored as represented information in the brain, muscles, and other 
parts of the body. I marvel when I look at a brain surgeon or an airline 
pilot. They look like you and me, yet have stored within their brains and 
bodies knowledge and action capabilities that I do not have. Likewise, I 
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have some that they lack. Human beings’ large, general-purpose brains 
can store so many amazing different capabilities. When we use those capa-
bilities, we are enacting (a form of embodiment) information that other-
wise remains stored as encoded information.
We can also communicate with other animals through language and 
other behaviors intended to send meaningful messages. Such expressed 
information is another form of embodying our encoded information 
stores.
So, altogether, we embody our neural (encoded) stores of information 
through experiencing, enacting, and expressing. All of the latter three fit 
the definition of embodied information, i.e., they are the corporeal expres-
sion or manifestation of information previously in encoded form.
Embodiment in Relation to Exosomatic Information
In my earlier article (Bates [2006] 2016), I adopted Goonatilake’s con-
ceptualization of three information flow lineages—the genetic flow line, 
the neural-cultural, and the exosomatic (Goonatilake 1991, 118–20). The 
line that all life has is the genetic. The ability to grow and reproduce, that 
is, to be a living thing, depends on the transmission to new generations 
of genetic material. Much of the history of a group of animals or plants 
is contained within the evolved DNA stored in their genetic information.
Next comes the neural-cultural flow line. Information stored in nervous 
systems can be taught to the young, as the mother tiger teaches her cub to 
hunt. The capacity to learn to hunt is born with the cub, but that capacity 
must be shaped by the mother into actual behavioral patterns that fit well 
with the specific environmental circumstances into which the cub is born. 
And in advanced species, such as our own, these capacities are embedded 
in rich cultures of language, practice, and previously made artifacts and 
structures.
The neural-cultural tool extraordinaire of human beings is, of course, 
language, which enables people to describe things and situations that are 
not present. Our large brains enable the storage of a huge amount of ma-
terial, and, through the use of language and observation, others can learn 
that same material with relative ease. However, the neural-cultural line 
of transmission requires that the receiver be in the physical presence of 
the sender. That transmission is still limited by the capacity of the human 
brain, and to the coexistence in the same place of the teacher and student.
Finally, in addition to the use of language in the neural-cultural lineage, 
human beings developed their own distinctive information flow lineage—
exosomatic storage. Exosomatic information is information stored in durable 
form external to the body. This ability was precociously expressed in wall 
paintings in caves tens of thousands of years ago but did not become com-
mon in carvings, statues, and, finally, writing, until more recent times. 
Once we figured out that we could record information on objects external 
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to ourselves, we were no longer limited to the size of our brain capacity for 
storage, nor to the need to have sender and receiver present together at 
the same time. Previously, we could communicate through expressed in-
formation. However, such information, whether spoken, sung, or danced, 
is ephemeral. It exists only in the moment it is expressed and then dis-
appears. Once we could record information on something durable, we 
could keep it and refer to it indefinitely; we could hand it down to later 
generations. In contrast to the ephemerality of expressed information, 
recorded information is communicatory or memorial information preserved 
in a durable medium.
Recall what was said earlier—that when natural information encounters 
a nervous system, (some of) that information is converted to represented 
information and stored in encoded or embodied form in the brain. The 
same thing can be said of exosomatic information. When encountered by 
an understanding nervous system, it can be converted into stored informa-
tion in the brain.
Recall also that it was said that when natural information encountered a 
nervous system or an extension of a nervous system, it could also be converted 
into represented information. In the last several hundred years, human 
beings have developed a myriad of forms of extensions of nervous systems, 
designed both to take in information and to communicate it outward. To 
better see the information, we developed microscopes and telescopes to 
enlarge the sight being observed. To capture information, we invented 
microphones, still and moving cameras, and numerous other information 
technologies. To send it out, we invented the telegraph, telephone, radio, 
film, television, and all the other information technologies we use daily.
Once this information is captured into some kind of durable exoso-
matic form, it, too, can be manipulated in countless ways to achieve hu-
man goals of usability and understandability. We see information being 
converted back and forth between encoded and embodied forms within 
our storage and transmission technologies constantly. For example, the 
television signal that comes in over my cable connection is, like so many 
of the signals in human brains, in a form that in no way resembles the final 
product. It comes into my television as encoded electronic pulses, and the 
technology in the television then converts it to an embodied image, which is 
understandable and interpretable by us humans. This transformation by 
the technology enables us to have our own embodied experience of the 
content of the television program.
The embodiment on the television screen is not complete. We do not 
receive a physical human being sitting at a newscaster’s desk in our living 
room. Rather, we see instead a two-dimensional image of that broadcaster, 
enclosed within the limits of the dimensions of our television screen. But 
the appearance of that person looks very much like the appearance of 
that person would look if we were both in the same physical place. So, this 
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two-dimensional version of the embodied image is a good approximation 
to the full experience of mutual presence in the same studio, i.e., full 
embodiment.
Once we found a way to represent language in writing, we then had the 
capacity to record and retain linguistic material for an indefinitely long 
time. For much of human history since the invention of writing, recorded 
information in the form of written language was the primary means of 
communicating through the generations. In the last couple of centuries, 
we have invented many other technologies that supplement, and in some 
cases, are beginning to replace written language. Instead of writing a note 
to a friend, one now sends a photo from a smart phone. Instead of study-
ing the written text of a play, a student watches a performance of the play 
on the internet. All these information technologies are extensions of ner-
vous systems, both on the sending and receiving ends, and involve both 
encoded and embodied information in the information technology and 
in the human being.
Implications for the Study of Information Behavior/Practice
The relative popularity of various different technologies for retaining and 
displaying recorded information varies through time and with the inven-
tion of ever-newer means of retention and transmission. But the overall 
pattern for human beings is one of capturing and using information, of 
storing and sending information, of the several types described in this 
article. (Note: Two other forms of information described in Bates [(2006) 
2016, 1036], embedded information and trace information, will not be dis-
cussed here, but fit within the overall framework.)
The human being is awash in information. This information comes 
from within the body and from the bodies of others. It comes through our 
sensorium, and, since the development of the vast range of information 
technologies we use today, it comes through these various extensions of 
nervous systems as well. We process and use all these forms of information. 
These uses include the integration of experience with memories and new 
thoughts.
It is all one giant information ecology. Failure to recognize and study 
any one important element of that ecology is to fail to some degree in 
the overall challenge of understanding information behavior. Embodied 
information has been underrecognized in information research to date. 
That this situation is changing rapidly is evidenced by the writing in these 
issues of Library Trends, building on a number of recent papers in this topic 
area. We are well on the way to filling out our understanding of all the 
many sources of information that people draw upon to conduct their lives.
On the other hand, information researchers are not studying the en-
tirety of human life and actions! Instead, we identify what I have called the 
“red thread” of information that weaves its way through the activities of 
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life (Bates [1999] 2016, 1048). Information seeking and use is a part of all 
the other activities we engage in during our lives. Research in information 
studies seeks to develop an understanding of this crucial thread in our 
lives. We want, ultimately, to understand where and how information fits 
within the broader texture of human life.
Part 2. Theoretical Background 
Having laid out in part 1 a way to use my earlier information concepts in 
the context of information and embodiment, in this section I will take 
up three themes to illustrate and deepen the understanding of part 1. 
These themes are information, embodiment, and extension. But first, a bit 
more needs to be said about the nature of the literature available in rel-
evant parts of biology, anthropology, cognitive science, psychology, and 
information science.
There is a very large shift—or perhaps it should be described as a “con-
tested shift”—from earlier models of the relationship between mind and 
body and between perception and the brain to new models. This shift has 
been happening in a number of different specialties and along different, 
but related, streams of thought and research. 
I had been aware of some of this literature, but when I reopened my 
background search on this material for this article a dozen years after 
writing the information papers, I found a vast body of research and theo-
rizing extending across specialties variously known as ecological psychol-
ogy, cognitive biology, grounded cognition, embodied cognition, and the 
cognitive nonconscious. 
One article (A. D. Wilson and Golonka 2013) mentions a book review-
ing three distinct theoretical and research-based conceptualizations of 
embodied cognition (Shapiro 2011), then notes that another author in a 
respected journal reports six such models (M. Wilson 2002).
Or consider two books, each titled Cognitive Biology, one published in 
2009 (Tommasi, Peterson, and Nadel) and the other in 2011 (Auletta). 
The latter book is a monster—a large format 850-page treatise. Its refer-
ence list is 110 pages long; a sampling estimate yields a number of about 
2,750 references in the list. The former book is a collection of papers by 
a total of thirty-two authors. As a test, I looked up all thirty-two Tommasi, 
Peterson, and Nadel authors in Auletta’s reference list. Only seven out of 
the thirty-two authors appear there. Furthermore, in the introduction, the 
Tommasi, Peterson, and Nadel book explicitly eschews any relationship 
to a 1980 article by Boden and Khin Zaw titled “The Case for a Cognitive 
Biology” (Tommasi, Nadel, and Peterson 2009, 11). Auletta (2011) also 
does not cite Boden and Khin Zaw (1980).
Katherine Hayles (2016), on the other hand, who has written exten-
sively on literature, computers, and the digital world, relies throughout 
her article about “the cognitive nonconscious” on Ladislav Kováč’s article 
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“Fundamental Principles of Cognitive Biology” (2000). Nothing by Kováč 
is to be found in either Auletta (2011) or Tommasi, Peterson, and Nadel 
(2009). This all would suggest that the concept of cognitive biology has 
not yet converged on a single accepted model any more than embodied 
cognition has.
All this is by way of saying that these more body-based theories about 
animal living and information inputs/processing/outputs has generated 
a vast literature, and that these ideas are still very much in flux and hotly 
contested among biologists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists. So, 
how can we use them in information science?
First, we have the advantage that these other fields are not our own; we 
can leave the actual experimenting and theorizing about cognition and 
the body to them. Our purpose is to expand our understanding of infor-
mation seeking and use to include a richer and more extensive vision of all 
the influences on the human relationship to information. The fundamen-
tal lesson we learn from all this literature is that any model of information 
practice that does not include the body and the nonconscious processing 
that accompanies the conscious information work is incomplete. We need 
to build our own models of people in relation to information in ways that 
incorporate at least a general understanding of this new view of informa-
tion that is being developed in the natural sciences, without attempting to 
resolve the still unresolved differences among the theories of embodiment 
in those fields.
In this review, I approach that challenge by discussing several broad 
themes that can be found in this literature, and show how they relate to 
part 1 of this article and to the theme of these Library Trends issues on 
information and the body. These themes are information, embodiment, 
and extension.
Information
Information and Survival 
The noted ethologist, Konrad Lorenz, wrote:
Life is an eminently active enterprise aimed at acquiring both a fund 
of energy and a stock of knowledge, the possession of one being in-
strumental to the acquisition of the other. (Lorenz 1977, as cited in 
Kováč 2007, 70)
All animals use information to get around safely in the world. For exam-
ple, because we can see, we do not bump in a chair when we walk into a 
room. It is important to understand, however, that this pattern of using 
information to protect and support successful living holds true all up and 
down the line, from the smallest to the largest animals.
Every animal has what biologist J. von Uexküll ([1934] 2010) called an 
“umwelt,” that is, a surrounding perceptual life-world that is distinctive to 
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that animal’s experience. This umwelt is associated with whatever senses 
the animal has, and its size and relationship to the surrounding world. The 
world as experienced by each species (and sometimes, especially among 
humans, by each individual within a species) is dramatically different from 
one to another. To take a simple example: Eagles have much greater re-
solving power in their eyes than we do, and consequently can see small 
mice and voles running around on the ground from very far up in the 
air—from distances that human beings could not possibly make out. In-
deed, an eagle is said to be able to spot a rabbit 3.2 km away (Wikipedia 
2017). It is fair to say that the world looks very different to an eagle than 
it does to us humans.
Information gathering and processing will happen differently with each 
species and individual, but, by Lorenz’s principle, all living species need 
energy to live, and they need information to find energy. They use both in 
order to do all the other things, such as evade predators and reproduce, 
that animals do to survive. 
Ladislav Kováč, in his “Fundamental Principles of Cognitive Biology” 
(2000), has worded it somewhat differently:
There is a universal characteristic of any living system to sense relevant 
features of its surroundings and to react appropriately upon them in 
order to preserve its own permanence, its onticity (54).
 Hence, life from its very beginning is a cognitive system: the self-
copying molecule, pursuing its onticity in the world . . . is already a 
subject facing the world as an object. (59)
Hoffmeyer (1997) demonstrates how the quest for energy and informa-
tion operates in the behavior of even the lowly Escherichia coli bacterium. 
Coli bacteria move in the direction that offers more nutrient molecules 
rather than less. They do this by measuring the saturation of their che-
moreceptor sites while moving. Hoffmeyer spends two pages describing 
how the bacterium does this, and then notes that he has just scratched the 
surface of this “highly complex system.” I bring it up only to show the role 
of information and energy in this bacterium’s behavior.
The e. coli gets the necessary information, as noted above, by measur-
ing the nutrient saturation in its umwelt. Now, how can it move in the 
more nutrient-rich direction? Basically, these bacteria have developed the 
capacity to do two particular things. The flagella, the thread-like struc-
tures that it uses to swim, may rotate either clockwise or counterclock-
wise. Counterclockwise rotation leads to linear movement, and clockwise 
rotation makes the bacterium tumble around itself. When the saturation 
is good, the bacterium goes in the linear direction toward the richer re-
sources. When the saturation is poor or declining, the bacterium tumbles 
around itself, lands randomly pointed in another direction, then again 
measures saturation. It does this repeatedly until it lands in a direction 
where the saturation is improving.
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The bacterium samples the environment for the relevant information, 
then can either move toward the nutrients or randomly tumble itself in 
another direction, in an effort to find the desired nutrients. Hoffmeyer’s 
story elegantly demonstrates Lorenz’s point that all living things are quest-
ing for energy and information.
The Law of Requisite Variety
Putting all of this in still more general terms, W. R. Ashby developed what 
he called the Law of Requisite Variety. This law holds that for a system 
(whether machine or organism) to function successfully, it must generate 
as much variety in its responses to the environment as the environment 
generates as input to the system (Ashby 1973, 202–12), with the exception 
of the cases where the same response can be used for more than one type 
of disturbance. Variety may come in the form of a physical disturbance or of 
information.
Let us imagine a physician who responds to most nighttime telephone 
calls from his patients by saying, “Take two aspirin and call me in the 
morning.” This may suffice for many conditions being reported by the 
patients, but suppose that in one case the patient goes on to have a heart 
attack and dies. The patient’s family sues the doctor for malpractice, the 
doctor loses, and subsequently loses his license to practice. In order to 
make a living, the doctor goes to work in a remote jungle town in another 
country, but he makes little money and is subject to many exotic diseases. 
We can fairly say that the failure to respond adequately to the patient’s 
“disturbance” has led to a much lower quality of life for the doctor and a 
higher likelihood of dying early.
Humans, possessing our large, general-purpose brains, have a lot of 
flexibility and choice, but all animals, including us, are subject to certain 
limits imposed by our genetic makeup. There is no guarantee that any 
species will always have a suitable response to a disturbance (Kováč 2000, 
63). If global warming produces conditions beyond what a given species 
of animal is capable of responding to, then the animal, and possibly the 
whole species, will die off.
A lot of research in information science has been about what are, in ef-
fect, optional information-searching activities: scholars doing research for 
a book, hobbyists finding out how to carry out a hobby, etc. But at another 
level, information seeking is vital to survival—finding the right special-
ist to treat a newly diagnosed condition, for example. Walter (1994) has 
described the information needs of children. These needs are not only 
about finding a favorite picture book in the library. They are also about, 
say, learning to look both ways before crossing a street. A child living in 
a chaotic household with drug-addicted parents, who is seldom even fed 
regularly, needs to learn about how to cross a street, for the sake of sur-
vival, because no one is teaching her.
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Information Literacy
Information literacy, in library parlance, has traditionally meant knowing 
how to find information, and knowing how to evaluate that information 
once found. This term, however, has recently begun to be used in a much 
broader sense. 
Annemaree Lloyd (2010) formalizes her definition of the term as fol-
lows:
Knowledge of information sources within an environment and an un-
derstanding of how these sources and the activities used to access them 
is constructed through discourse. Information literacy is constituted 
through the connections that exist between people, artifacts, texts and 
bodily experience that enable individuals to develop both subjective 
and intersubjective positions. (26)
Lloyd goes on to describe in much more detail the various elements of 
this broader understanding, including, for example, knowing how infor-
mation is situated in a landscape, what forms of information are valued, 
how to locate information appropriate to a task, and having the capacity 
to move beyond context and seek information that will enhance practice 
(27–28). Here, in effect, information literacy is knowing how to secure 
the information to cope with and succeed in any environment one enters. 
This is a much richer and fuller understanding of information literacy 
than has traditionally obtained, and addresses the fuller demands of one’s 
whole life. 
This section started with the need for all life to secure energy and in-
formation. It has ended with a fuller understanding of how information 
seeking and use can enrich human life and enhance life success.
Embodiment
Now that we have a somewhat broader and more biologically based un-
derstanding of the role of information in animal and human life, let us 
consider the role of the body in that information seeking and use.
Cognitive science was dominated for many years by a computational 
metaphor—the brain as computer, processing inputs through the body’s 
sensorium, storing the results in short or long-term memory, and output-
ting the results of further processing (Horst 1999, 170). Aside from being 
an input/output channel, the body apart from the brain was not much 
discussed. Experiments were commonly done wherein, for example, the 
head might be held in a fixed position and the eye’s response to pinpoints 
of light in a darkened room studied. The idea was to hold all other vari-
ables constant while studying just the action and responses of the eye.
After a while, several streams of criticism of this analytical approach 
developed. These criticisms take various approaches, but they all argue for 
more attention to the body and for a more unified conception of brain 
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and body working together in their interaction with their environment. 
Hutchins (2010, 428) states it as follows:
Embodiment is the premise that the particular bodies we have influ-
ence how we think. . . . According to the embodied perspective, cogni-
tion is situated in the interaction of body and world, dynamic bodily 
processes such as motor activity can be part of reasoning processes, 
and offline cognition is body-based too. Finally, embodiment assumes 
that cognition evolved for action, and because of this, perception and 
action are not separate systems, but are inextricably linked to each 
other and to cognition. 
Below, several related streams of research and theory regarding em-
bodiment will be discussed: ecological psychology, the new unconscious 
and the cognitive nonconscious, and grounded and embodied cognition.
Ecological Psychology
One of the earliest such critics was James Gibson, who developed a new 
theory of how perception works (1950, 1966, [1979] 2015). He mainly 
studied vision, but examined all the other senses as well. This theory is 
subtle, but has huge implications for psychology and neuroscience. While 
its originality is widely recognized, the theory goes counter to so much in 
classical cognitive science that it has still not taken a dominating role in 
the psychology of vision (Mace 2015).
Gibson’s work has many applications, though, to information studies. 
For starters, he argued that the traditional fixed-head-in-a-dark-room sort 
of experiments, while they provided some information of use, were not at 
all reflective of how people really see, and how animals move through life 
seeing things around them. He called his last book The Ecological Approach 
to Visual Perception. There followed an International Society for Ecological 
Psychology, and a journal named Ecological Psychology (Mace 2015). His 
emphasis on the person in a real-world environment is very appropriate 
to the concerns of a field such as ours. We are dealing with people need-
ing information in real-life contexts, so an ecological approach suits well. 
Further, I would argue that most computer-search interfaces do not har-
monize well with the way people interact with information as they move 
through life. (This is the subject of another paper I am working on.)
So, what was Gibson’s theory? Most understanding of vision assumes 
that the sense receptors in the eye take in images, which are sent to the 
brain and processed, then the person can act on these perceptions. Gib-
son argued that that is not the way we see at all. Instead, the eyes are just 
one part of several larger systems that process visual information, each sys-
tem working on distinctive aspects of vision. “The perceptual capacities of 
the organism . . . lie in systems with nested functions” (Gibson [1979] 
2015, 195).
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People see through eyes that each have their own vision capabilities (1st 
system), that are in a larger system of muscles that direct and move the 
eyes (2nd system), that are in a binocular system of two eyes, each sens-
ing information (3rd system), that are in a head that moves (4th system), 
that, in turn, is in a body that moves (5th system), and all parts of this 
system function together to achieve vision (Gibson [1979] 2015, 234). For 
example, proprioceptive cues for location of body and parts of the body 
play a key role in helping vision succeed. The senses “are all more or less 
subordinated to an overall orienting system” (234).
Further, the information taken in during seeing should not be thought 
of as being like a movie recording countless individual images that flow 
together to be processed by the brain. That would actually be a very inef-
ficient way of taking in information, and nature rarely wastes energy where 
it does not need to. (Remember, for most species most of the time, energy 
to support perceptual or cognitive activity is precious and hard to get.) 
Gibson said that, instead, our visual system(s) look for invariances in 
the “ambient optical array,” i.e., what is available to the eye to see, in a 
real context, with a surface below, objects in a field of vision, and light sur-
rounding an individual. Further, we look for what he called “affordances.” 
“The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” ([1979] 2015, 119). 
According to Barrett (2011), “The concept of affordance means that 
what goes on in an animal’s head . . . cannot be separated from how it 
moves its body about in the world” (98). “For a human, of a certain size, 
with two legs that bend in the middle and a squashy bottom, a chair af-
fords the possibility of sitting, as does a tree stump, but such objects do 
not afford sitting to a giraffe or a cow” (98). She notes that the nature of 
exploratory behavior means that perception and motor action necessarily 
“work together to detect and exploit affordances” (98). In turn, different 
animals, having different relationships to their environments, i.e., differ-
ent umwelts, will see the world as providing different affordances.
So, rather than vision being the taking in of an undifferentiated contin-
uous movie that is sent to the brain for processing, we, in effect, establish 
through vision an understanding of what the world affords us. We are aware 
of surfaces and the medium in which we live. In other words, it could be 
said that we establish what is “out there” in terms of surfaces, medium, and 
affordances, then process only the changes that we detect.
As Gibson ([1979] 2015, 299) says:
My description of the environment . . . and of the changes that can 
occur in it . . . implies that places, attached objects, objects, and sub-
stances are what are mainly perceived, together with events, which are 
changes of these things. To see these things is to perceive what they 
afford. This is very different from the accepted categories of what there 
is to perceive as described in the textbooks. Color, form, location, space, 
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time, and motion—these are the chapter headings that have been 
handed down through the centuries, but they are not what is perceived. 
Compare the differences in energy use and processing effort between, 
on the one hand, taking in the sight of the entire world around you on a 
continuous movie-like basis, followed by continuous processing to extract 
meaning from the input, and, on the other hand, establishing what is “out 
there” and then simply monitoring for changes in it. The latter requires 
much less effort.
We look for affordances all the time, because we use affordances to help 
us live. In my 2006 article (Bates [2006] 2016), where I developed differ-
ent concepts of information, I discussed the work of Edwin Hutchins in 
his book Cognition in the Wild (1995). He was interested in studying how 
cognition works “in the wild,” that is, in real life, rather than in a labora-
tory. I saw his study as a work on information seeking and use as well. He 
studied the crew of a U.S. Navy vessel, as they successfully navigated their 
ship into port.
The very layout of the ship and the design of the bridge promoted the 
smooth flow of information from the exterior of the ship to the crew 
and among the crewmembers. Each crewmember took on a distinct, 
but coordinated, role. Critical information was posted at just the right 
locations for use. Likewise, navigation practices required that not one, 
but two crewmembers have certain crucial pieces of information at the 
same time to reduce the likelihood of error. . . . Even the format design 
of the forms the crew filled out made it easier for them to complete 
their work successfully. (Bates [2006] 2016, 1042–43)
Though I did not use the word, notice how affordances are operating 
throughout this description—the affordances of ship design, of informa-
tion location, of coordinated crew actions (social affordances), and so on. 
In working together, people, ship design, and information design all cre-
ated a successful act of navigation. These techniques are all a part of the 
toolkit of animals operating in a world of possible affordances. In sum, 
in Gibson’s argument, perception is fundamentally a part of a whole-body 
process interacting with the world as it is.
The concept of affordances is very important to user-centered design 
of information systems, human-computer interaction research, informa-
tion architecture, and user experience design. See, for example, Hinton’s 
(2015) book on context and design, which draws on Gibson.
The New Unconscious and the Cognitive Nonconscious
For most of the twentieth century, the concept “unconscious” was cap-
tured largely by the Freudian understanding of the unconscious, as being 
the part of the psyche holding emotional drives and needs that were often 
repressed out of awareness. The unconscious came to be seen as a force 
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countering the sweet reason of conscious rationality, and which engaged 
in a continual war with our conscious choices and preferred self-image.
More recently, a new conceptualization of the unconscious has devel-
oped. Uleman (2005, 5) attributes the start of this new movement to John 
Kihlstrom’s 1987 article, “The Cognitive Unconscious,” which looked at a 
lot of forms of processing that are not conscious. Kihlstrom noted: “Re-
search on perceptual-cognitive and motoric skills indicates that they are 
automatized through experience, and thus rendered unconscious” (1987, 
1445). The “new unconscious is much more concerned with affect, mo-
tivation, and even control and metacognition than was the old cognitive 
unconscious. Goals, motives, and self-regulation are prominent, without 
the conflict and drama of the psychoanalytical unconscious” (Uleman 
2005, 6). The new discussion is not about unconscious drives, but rather 
about the many ways we process information out of awareness and use it 
in real time, sometimes melded with conscious decisions, and sometimes 
not (Hassin, Uleman, and Bargh 2005).
Developing a slightly difference conception of the “nonconscious,” in 
recent articles (2014; 2016), and in a newly-published book (2017), Kath-
erine Hayles argues that “nonconscious cognition” cannot be brought into 
awareness but is nonetheless necessary to effective conscious functioning. 
Among other things, nonconscious cognition processes information faster 
than can consciousness, recognizes patterns too complex and subtle for 
consciousness to discern, and draws inferences that influence behavior 
and help to determine priorities (2017, 10). She argues that we can see 
important roles for nonconscious cognition not only in human beings but 
also in other life forms, and in sophisticated technical systems as well, and, 
further, that we should aim to develop a unified theory for the role and 
nature of such cognition across these several domains.
Grounded and Embodied Cognition 
Lawrence Barsalou’s review article, “Grounded Cognition” (2008), com-
prehensively reviews the research on whether cognition is operating 
purely as abstract thought or else is grounded in other forms of awareness, 
particularly, as simulations.
Simulation is the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective 
states acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind. As an 
experience occurs (e.g., easing into a chair), the brain captures states 
across the modalities [input channels] and integrates them with a mul-
timodal representation stored in memory (e.g., how a chair looks and 
feels, the action of sitting, introspections of comfort and relaxation). 
(Barsalou 2008, 618)
For example, among the many research studies Barsalou reports are these:
Bub et al. (2007) showed that a perceived object (or object name) 
automatically triggers simulations of both grasping and functional ac-
tions. . . . 
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 Researchers increasingly extend these original findings in creative 
ways. In Bosbach et al. (2005), accurately judging the weight of an 
object lifted by another agent requires simulating the lifting action in 
one’s own motor and somatosensory systems. (Barsalou 2008, 624)
Thus, it is commonly the case that thoughts and ideas experienced in the 
conscious mind also have simultaneous processing correlates elsewhere in 
the body; we simulate an experience throughout the body, not just in the 
conscious mind. 
Barsalou distinguishes grounded cognition from embodied cognition by say-
ing that the latter phrase “produces the mistaken assumption that all re-
searchers in this community believe that bodily states are necessary for 
cognition and that these researchers focus exclusively on bodily states in 
their investigations” (2008, 619). For the remainder, I will nonetheless use 
the term embodied cognition, because it is more widely used (according to 
Web of Science and Psycinfo), and with the understanding that the embodied-
cognition approach both recognizes and incorporates bodily states, but is 
not limited to them in its thinking.
Another stream of research that emphasizes embodiment is that by 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1999). Lakoff and Johnson ar-
gue that our use of metaphor in language is pervasive and is rooted in 
bodily and physical life experience. We are constantly describing love as 
a journey, good as up and bad as down, and so on. These usages are so 
common that they often are not recognized as metaphors at all. Here are 
some example sentences:
Love as a journey
Look how far we’ve come. 
It’s been a long, bumpy road.
We’re at a crossroads. 
We may have to go our separate ways. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 64)
Conscious is up, unconscious is down
Get up. Wake up.
He fell asleep. He sank into a coma. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 15)
Good as up; bad as down
Things are looking up! 
Things are at an all-time low. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 16)
However, Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis is not limited to everyday quotid-
ian activities. Johnson (2007) and Lakoff and Nuñez (2000) argue that 
much abstract thought is rooted in the same embodied experiences as 
described in the above colloquial examples. Johnson (2007, 177) states, 
“The most sweeping claim of conceptual metaphor theory is that what 
we call abstract concepts are defined by systematic mappings from body-
based, sensorimotor source domains onto abstract target domains.” He 
then develops the example of “the common conceptual metaphor CAT-
EGORIES ARE CONTAINERS” (180). He notes that we say that the cat-
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egory “human” is contained in the category “animals” and the category 
“animals” is contained in the category “living things.” We are drawing on 
our physical experience of putting one thing inside another to describe 
the entirely abstract idea of categorizing concepts.
In information science, in recent years, there has been a surge of inter-
est in information and embodiment. A group of researchers has been pur-
suing the implications of embodiment for research in information prac-
tice and information literacy. Annemaree Lloyd’s study (2009) of people 
learning to be paramedics in Australia demonstrated the role of the body 
in both learning how to do the work through observation of experienced 
paramedics in action, and in “reading” the bodies of people being picked 
up for hospital transport. Cox (2013) argues for an “information in social 
practice” approach to studying what was formerly named “information be-
havior.” He emphasizes, among other things, the materiality and embodi-
ment of information activities, using personal photography as an example. 
See also Lueg’s (2015) argument for more attention to embodiment in 
information behavior research.
A collection of articles on the importance of bodily experience in infor-
mation practice has recently appeared, titled Information Experience (Bruce 
et al. 2014). Olsson (2016) and Olsson and Lloyd (2017) take this ap-
proach into the study of the work of archaeologists, drawing particular 
attention to the haptic forms of information pick-up. Hartel, Cox, and 
Griffin (2016) and Cox, Griffin, and Hartel (2017) amply demonstrate the 
importance of the body in several kinds of serious leisure activities. 
Finally, we cannot leave this section without noting two foundational 
books that have long provided a philosophical and theoretical ground-
ing within cognitive science for the embodied approach. I will make no 
attempt to review the detailed theoretical issues within cognitive science 
theory that are addressed by these books. For our purposes, it is enough 
to cite their titles: The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experi-
ence (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991) and Being There: Putting Brain, 
Body, and World Together Again (Clark 1997). We will return to Clark in the 
next section.
Extension
The concept of extension appears in several related senses in this discus-
sion.
The Extended Phenotype 
First, let us note the spider’s use of an extension—its web. The spider and 
its web is the very example chosen by Richard Dawkins (1982) for his con-
cept of the “extended phenotype.” (The genotype is the genetic inheri-
tance of an animal; the phenotype is the genetically and environmentally 
determined embodiment of a genotype, i.e., the animal itself.)
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Dawkins argued that the “houses” and other structures that animals 
manufacture outside their bodies can be considered extensions of their 
bodies, extensions that are really due to the genetic inheritance that pro-
duces the animal phenotype. These extensions, arguably, are a part of the 
animal, as they are crucially defining of the animal, and are associated with 
what leads to the success or failure of the animal in evolutionary terms.
Now consider a spider sitting at the centre of her web. . . . In a very 
real sense her web is a temporary functional extension of her body, a 
huge extension of the effective catchment area of her predatory organs. 
(Dawkins 1982, 198)
Catching prey in webs is so fundamental to the nature of the spider, and is 
so surely a major part of what enables the spider to survive and thrive, that 
we cannot seriously study spiders without including webs as a part of the 
study of the spider as a functioning animal. So, the extended phenotype of 
the spider consists of the spider itself, plus its web. It is the whole package, 
spider plus web, that either succeeds or fails evolutionarily. Likewise, if we 
want to study human beings, we must surely incorporate an understand-
ing that humans cover their hairless bodies with clothing in the cold, and 
build lean-tos/huts/houses to protect themselves from extreme climate 
and predation.
In a more recent book, Clark (2008) makes an extended theoretical 
and philosophical argument for exactly how he thinks cognitive scientists 
should think about bodily extensions and the body’s relation to the sur-
rounding environment:
Finally, the body, by being the immediate locus of willed action, is also 
the gateway to intelligent offloading. The body . . . is the primary tool 
enabling the intelligent use of environmental structure. It acts as the 
mobile bridge that allows us to exploit the external world in ways that 
simplify and transform internal problem solving. The body is thus the 
go-between that links these two different (internal and external) sets of 
key information-processing resources. Hence, the body’s role in such 
cases is that of a bridging instrument enabling the repeated emergence 
of new kinds of distributed information-processing organization. (207)
When we need to multiply 3102 by 425, it is certainly easier to do so if 
we employ a piece of paper and pencil, or a calculator, to do it. For most 
of us, figuring out the answer to that problem in our heads is very chal-
lenging and subject to error. We need the extension of paper and pencil 
to carry out this mental operation successfully. Likewise, if we can consult 
a book or website to find out the population of Turkey, our use of these 
forms of external assistance makes possible what would otherwise require 
an extensive and possibly fruitless search to find the answer among bu-
reaucrats in Turkey. By recording and collecting vast amounts of informa-
tion, and developing structures—from the bookshelf to the digital library, 
from the catalog to the online database—to make it available, we have 
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multiplied our information power astronomically. A full understanding 
of information seeking, acquisition, and use requires us to see how these 
extensions of our phenotypes enable us to succeed in the information 
tasks that confront us.
Diane Mizrachi studied how college students contended with the ar-
ray of challenges facing students in today’s rich media and technology 
environment (Mizrachi and Bates 2013). Currently, we are moving among 
a number of rapidly changing communication patterns and information 
technologies. Students had their own preferences among the numerous 
devices that are available, from smartphones to laptops to portable lis-
tening devices, and their professors had their own mix of preferences as 
well—required text, online information store, class handouts, and so on. 
Each student used a different mix of these abundant possibilities, depend-
ing on personal preferences and the types of classes being taken. This 
academic information management is not a trivial challenge, and success in 
handling this challenge can affect student success in college. 
The authors summarize the extensive methods used by students in 
managing their academic information: 
Cognitive and physical interactions with academic information include 
reviewing, reading, writing, copying, sorting, piling, filing, discarding, 
deleting, archiving, placing (purposefully setting information within 
the environment for accessibility, visibility, and reminding), shift-
ing . . . and prioritizing (by urgency or importance). (Mizrachi and 
Bates 2013, 1600)
Niche Construction
One of the most recent manifestations of Dawkins’s theme of the ex-
tended phenotype occurs in an area of biology called “niche construc-
tion” (Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003). Researchers in this area 
argue that 
the evolution of organisms is co-directed by both natural selection 
and niche construction. While genetic variation is subject to natural se-
lection through differential survival and reproductive success, the selective 
environments themselves are partly determined by modifications made by niche-
constructing organisms. . . . Evolution entails networks of causation and 
feedback in which previously selected organisms drive environmental 
changes, and organism-modified environments subsequently select for 
changes in organisms. (italics added) (Kendal, Tehrani, and Odling-
Smee 2011, 785) 
Beavers build wooden lodges on rivers and streams to dam up the wa-
ter flow in order to provide safe and warm housing within the lodge for 
themselves, their offspring, and food storage. This inborn set of behaviors 
provides considerable protection from extreme weather and predators for 
the living beavers. As the above authors argue, this niche construction 
behavior, in turn, affects natural selection, so that there is a reciprocal 
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relationship between the usual model of natural selection and natural se-
lection as affected by the niche construction efforts of animals. 
Here is an example of evolution affected by niche construction that has 
been discovered in humans: First, humans figured out how to domesti-
cate pastoral animals, and thus bring a great deal of valuable, high-energy 
meat and milk under our control. However, most humans were not able 
to digest milk after about the age of two, when nursing ends. Eventually, a 
mutation came along that enabled people to continue to digest the lactose 
in milk for the rest of their lives. This mutation greatly increased the nour-
ishment available to human beings in the colder areas of Europe, where 
it became most dominant. This beneficial mutation consequently spread 
very rapidly, and is still possessed by people of European origin and a few 
other places. Most people in other regions did not acquire the mutation. 
Thus, modern humans are a mix of people who can comfortably drink 
milk and those who are lactose intolerant (Gerbault et al. 2011).
The human niche construction ability that led to our domesticating 
farm animals enabled us to have ready access to large amounts of high-en-
ergy nourishment. Members of our species who happened to have the mu-
tation for lactose tolerance thrived better amid a growing population, so 
natural selection benefited them, and the mutation spread rapidly in the 
population. Thus, niche construction played a major role in the evolved 
nature of the organism that we are today. 
Looking back on the history of human beings, the moment we figured 
out how to farm, in addition to hunting and gathering, we were enabled 
to feed a much larger population and build long-lasting, strong, and pro-
tective housing. When people made farming innovations, the prior devel-
opment of language enabled us to communicate the techniques used for 
farming and building to the next generation, and so continue a powerful 
mode of niche construction that greatly promoted and improved our sur-
vival. Once we developed the capacity to create such extensive exosomatic 
structure to support our cognition and reproduction, we gained consider-
able capacity to ease the dangers faced by prior generations of hominins.
Indeed, Kim Sterelny (2011, 809), also a supporter of the niche con-
struction model, argues that 
humans became behaviorally modern when they could reliably trans-
mit accumulated informational capital to the next generation, and 
transmit it with sufficient precision for innovations to be preserved and 
accumulated. In turn, the reliable accumulation of culture depends on 
the construction of learning environments, not just intrinsic cognitive 
machinery.
Our large, general-purpose brain has enabled us to create an extraordi-
narily rich and extensive niche on the planet. Our capacities have enabled 
us to adapt to and live in all the surface environments of the planet. The 
development of language and large memories enabled us to store vast 
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amounts of knowledge for later generations. Once we figured out how to 
record that knowledge on durable exosomatic storage devices, such as tab-
lets and books, we experienced a veritable explosion of stored knowledge, 
which we could, in turn, use for further niche development. 
Niche construction even shows itself in the literal sense when we or-
ganize our informational environments. The dormitory rooms of the 
students Mizrachi studied were small and housed two or three students 
each. The desks of the students were each distinctly organized according 
to whatever practices were most effective for each student. Indeed, this is 
true for most offices. Most of us could justify why each stack of books or 
papers must be exactly where it is in our own offices. The generic term 
for this kind of organization is personal information management, or PIM 
(Jones and Teevan 2007). The large research literature on PIM will not be 
reviewed here, but note that the capacity to engage in PIM is a capability 
for a particular kind of niche construction, a capacity that humans have 
in abundance. 
Cognitive Assemblages
The latest and most sophisticated form of human niche construction is 
what Hayles calls “cognitive assemblages” (2017). These are the giant 
combinations of human beings, material resources, computers, and intel-
lectual and physical systems that we have created to manage people and 
resources for our benefit. Examples are the internet, traffic-management 
systems, and financial markets. The Automated Traffic Surveillance and 
Control system in Los Angeles, for example, manages the 7,000 miles of 
roads in the area from a central command center (Hayles 2017, 121ff). It 
is a mix of managers, specialized computer algorithms, cameras, road sen-
sors, and drivers who call in local conditions. Timing of stop-light changes 
and other roadway factors can be modified centrally in real time, based on 
inputs from the sensors and human beings. Hayles:
The most transformative technologies of the later twentieth century 
have been cognitive assemblages. . . . While many modern technolo-
gies also had immense effects—the steam engine, railroads, antibiot-
ics, nuclear weapons and energy—cognitive assemblages are distinct 
because their transformative potentials are enabled, extended, and 
supported by flows of information, and consequently cognitions be-
tween humans and technical participants. Hybrid by nature, they raise 
questions about how agency is distributed among cognizers, how and 
in what ways actors contribute to system dynamics, and consequently 
how responsibilities—technical, social, legal, ethical—should be ap-
portioned. (2017, 119)
So, we have moved from the extended phenotype of the individual ani-
mal, to individual and collective niche construction, to human cognitive 
assemblages. These are all protections against risks and threats to survival. 
Obviously, with the amazing flexibility and vast extent of human niche 
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construction and cognitive assemblages, we are able to protect ourselves 
from many of the threats and contingencies of life, though the possibility 
always remains that we can also be fooled or misled by our own devices. 
Conclusion
In this article, I have presented an understanding of human information 
seeking and use that is intended to incorporate not only the conventional 
uses of recorded information that are discussed and researched in infor-
mation science but also all the much broader and more varied kinds of 
information that people absorb in their lives through and with their bod-
ies, and through and with the use of a vast array of bodily extensions. I 
have applied vocabulary terms developed in earlier articles (Bates 2005, 
[2006] 2016) to the concepts herein—namely, natural and represented 
information; embodied and encoded information; and experienced, en-
acted, expressed, and recorded information. These terms are all useful 
within the broader context of information and embodiment, as discussed 
in these Library Trends issues. Furthermore, a broad and necessarily selec-
tive review of relevant literature in biology, anthropology, psychology, phi-
losophy, and information science has been presented by way of supporting 
the body-emphasis of the first part of the paper.
We saw how fundamental information is to life. We saw that all life 
needs information and energy to survive, and that this is as true of a five-
year old child as it is of a bacterium. We came to recognize that a great 
deal of information processing is done out of awareness and is essential to 
conscious thought. Our language and thought are rooted in our physical 
bodies, and the seeking and absorption of information cannot be fully 
understood without including an awareness of this bodily basis of informa-
tion processing.
We learned that animals absorb information from the world in different 
and more efficient ways than is normally assumed, and that we use many 
extensions of our bodies in the world to help us gain information and 
process it effectively and fast. We saw how we humans, particularly, create 
niches that protect and support us against the threats that are common to 
all forms of life. 
Based on this review, I believe it is evident that there is much support for 
a fuller view of information seeking and use. To gain that understanding, 
it is necessary to recognize the many ways in which perception and cogni-
tion are bodily based, and the ways in which we use countless extensions 
to expand our processing, understanding, and utilization of resources.
I end this discussion with a graceful quotation from Katherine Hayles:
I want to . . . sketch in broad terms my vision of how a member of the 
Homo sapiens species encounters the world. Alert and responsive, she is 
capable of using reason and abstraction but is not trapped wholly within 
them; embedded in her environment, she is aware that she processes 
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information from many sources, including internal body systems and 
emotional and affectual nonconscious processes. She is open to and cu-
rious about the interpretive capacities of nonhuman others, including 
biological life-forms and technical systems; she respects and interacts 
with material forces, recognizing them as the foundations from which 
life springs; most of all, she wants to use her capabilities, conscious and 
nonconscious, to preserve, enhance, and evolve the planetary cognitive 
ecology as it continues to transform, grow, and flourish. (2017, 63–64)
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